David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 70 (January):23-78 (1987)
Commonsense psychology and cognitive science both regularly assume the existence of representational states. I propose a naturalistic theory of representation sufficient to meet the pretheoretical constraints of a "folk theory of representation", constraints including the capacities for accuracy and inaccuracy, selectivity of proper objects of representation, perspective, articulation, and "efficacy" or content-determined functionality. The proposed model states that a representing device is a device which changes state when information is received over multiple information channels originating at a single source. The changed state of a representing device is a representation. The unitary information source which would give rise to the information impinging on the representing device, and hence, give rise to the representation, is the content of the representation. The model meets the pretheoretic constraints, and also conforms to available neurobiological data for two invertebrate species
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind Psychology Representationalism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael A. Arbib (1987). Of Schemas, Neural Nets, and Rana Computatrix. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):451.
Michael A. Arbib (1987). Levels of Modeling of Mechanisms of Visually Guided Behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):407.
John A. Barnden (1987). The Centrality of Instantiations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):437.
J. -P. Ewert (1987). Advantage of Modeling in Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):438.
Keith Gunderson (1987). Levels of Psychological Reality, Arbib's “Schemas,” and Matters Maybe Metaphysical. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):439.
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