David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 70 (January):23-78 (1987)
Commonsense psychology and cognitive science both regularly assume the existence of representational states. I propose a naturalistic theory of representation sufficient to meet the pretheoretical constraints of a "folk theory of representation", constraints including the capacities for accuracy and inaccuracy, selectivity of proper objects of representation, perspective, articulation, and "efficacy" or content-determined functionality. The proposed model states that a representing device is a device which changes state when information is received over multiple information channels originating at a single source. The changed state of a representing device is a representation. The unitary information source which would give rise to the information impinging on the representing device, and hence, give rise to the representation, is the content of the representation. The model meets the pretheoretic constraints, and also conforms to available neurobiological data for two invertebrate species
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind Psychology Representationalism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1989). Misinformation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):533-50.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1992). Indication and Adaptation. Synthese 92 (2):283-312.
Michael A. Arbib (1987). Levels of Modeling of Mechanisms of Visually Guided Behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):407.
Alan K. Mackworth (1987). What is the Schema for a Schema? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):443.
John K. Tsotsos (1987). Schemas: Not yet an Interlingua for the Brain Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):447.
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