David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 104 (3):351 - 381 (1995)
The emphasis on the limitations of objectivity, in specific guises and networks, has been a continuing theme of contemporary analytic philosophy for the past few decades. The popular sport of baiting feminist philosophers — into pointing to what's left out of objective knowledge, or into describing what methods, exactly, they would offer to replace the powerful objective methods grounding scientific knowledge — embodies a blatant double standard which has the effect of constantly putting feminist epistemologists on the defensive, on the fringes, on the run.This strategy can only work if objectivity is transparent, simple, stable, and clear in its meaning. It most certainly is not. In fact, taking objectivity as a sort of beautiful primitive, self-evident in its value, and all-powerful in its revelatory power, requires careless philosophy, and the best workers in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science have made reworked definitions of objectivity absolutely central to their own projects. In fact, classic feminist concerns with exploring the impact of sex and gender on knowledge, understanding, and other relations between human beings and the rest of the world fall squarely within the sort of human and social settings thatare already considered central in most current analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. I argue that the burden of proof is clearly on those who wish toreject the centrality and relevance of sex and gender to our most fundamental philosophical work on knowledge and reality.
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Karyn L. Freedman (2009). Diversity and the Fate of Objectivity. Social Epistemology 23 (1):45-56.
Chris Calvert-Minor (2014). Epistemological Misgivings of Karen Barad's 'Posthumanism'. Human Studies 37 (1):123-137.
Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Vanessa J. Schweizer (2014). Objectivity and a Comparison of Methodological Scenario Approaches for Climate Change Research. Synthese 191 (10):2049-2088.
Joseph Rouse (2005). Epistemological derangement. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):835-847.
Joseph Rouse (2009). Standpoint Theories Reconsidered. Hypatia 24 (4):200 - 209.
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