David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 72 (2):287-310 (2005)
I argue that four of the fundamental claims of those calling themselves `genic pluralists'Philip Kitcher, Kim Sterelny, and Ken Watersare defective. First, they claim that once genic selectionism is recognized, the units of selection problems will be dissolved. Second, Sterelny and Kitcher claim that there are no targets of selection. Third, Sterelny, Kitcher, and Waters claim that they have a concept of genic causation that allows them to give independent genic causal accounts of all selection processes. I argue that each one of these claims is either false or misleading. Moreover, the challenge that arises from the availability of genic causal accounts, namely, the inability to choose on rational grounds among genic and higher-level accounts, is unsupported
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Michael J. Wade & Christopher C. Dimond (2013). Pluralism in Evolutionary Controversies: Styles and Averaging Strategies in Hierarchical Selection Theories. Biology and Philosophy 28 (6):957-979.
Massimo Pigliucci (2008). The Proper Role of Population Genetics in Modern Evolutionary Theory. Biological Theory 3 (4):316-324.
David Haig (2014). Genetic Dissent and Individual Compromise. Biology and Philosophy 29 (2):233-239.
Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Richard C. Lewontin & and Marcus W. Feldman (2008). The Generational Cycle of State Spaces and Adequate Genetical Representation. Philosophy of Science 75 (2):140-156.
Steven French (2011). Shifting to Structures in Physics and Biology: A Prophylactic for Promiscuous Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (2):164-173.
Similar books and articles
C. Kenneth Waters (1991). Tempered Realism About the Force of Selection. Philosophy of Science 58 (4):553-573.
Kim Sterelny & Philip Kitcher (1988). The Return of the Gene. Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):339-361.
Timothy Shanahan (1997). Pluralism, Antirealism, and the Units of Selection. Acta Biotheoretica 45 (2):117-126.
Elliott Sober & Richard C. Lewontin (1982). Artifact, Cause and Genic Selection. Philosophy of Science 49 (2):157-180.
Willem de Winter (1997). The Beanbag Genetics Controversy: Towards a Synthesis of Opposing Views of Natural Selection. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):149-184.
Matthew Dunn Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Jennifer Cianciollo & and Costas Mannouris (2005). Pluralism Without Genic Causes? Philosophy of Science 72 (2):334-341.
David Magnus (1998). Evolution Without Change in Gene Frequencies. Biology and Philosophy 13 (2):255-261.
Elisabeth Lloyd (2005). Pluralism Without Genic Causes? Philosophy of Science 72 (2):334-341.
P. Kyle Stanford (2001). The Units of Selection and the Causal Structure of the World. Erkenntnis 54 (2):215-233.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads151 ( #25,979 of 1,934,423 )
Recent downloads (6 months)37 ( #15,071 of 1,934,423 )
How can I increase my downloads?