Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627 - 643 (1982)
|Abstract||Two naturalistic explications of propositional attitudes and their contents are distinguished: the language of thought based theory, on which beliefs are relations to sentences in the language of thought; and the propositional attitude based theory, on which beliefs are functional states of a functional system that does not imply a language of thought, although consistent with it. The latter theory depends on interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles; if these are not available, the language of thought theory has the advantage. But the propositional attitude based theory explains intentionality and conceptual structure as well as the language of thought based theory, and it has two further advantages. First, it does not make the existence of beliefs and desires depend on the language of thought hypothesis. Secondly, its employment of interpersonally ascribable conceptual roles permits a theory of truth conditions to meet certain desiderata, such as a social basis for truth conditions, and a realist conception of truth|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
D. Bellé & F. Parlamento (2006). Truth in V for Ǝ ∀∀-Sentences Is Decidable. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (4):1200 - 1222.
Jordi Fernández (2010). Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge. Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.
Mikko Yrjönsuuri (1997). Supposition and Truth in Ockham's Mental Language. Topoi 16 (1):15-25.
Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Thomas Hofweber (2010). Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
J. A. Burgess (1997). Supervaluations and the Propositional Attitude Constraint. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):103-119.
Jerry Fodor (1982). A Reply to Brian Loar's "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:644 - 653.
Donald Davidson (1974). Belief and the Basis of Meaning. Synthese 27 (July-August):309-323.
Mark Textor (2001). Does the Truth-Conditional Theory of Sense Work for Indexicals? Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):119-137.
Gilbert Harman (1982). Beliefs and Concepts: Comments on Brian Loar, "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:654 - 661.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #49,956 of 740,478 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,960 of 740,478 )
How can I increase my downloads?