Dennett's mind

Inquiry 36 (1-2):59-72 (1993)
Drawing on data from contemporary experimental psychology and research in artificial intelligence, Dennett argues for a multiple drafts model of human consciousness, which he offers as an alternative to what he calls Cartesian materialism. I argue that the considerations Dennett advances do not, in fact, call for the abandonment of Cartesian materialism. Moreover, the theory presented by Dennett does not, as he claims, succeed in explaining consciousness; in particular, it fails to do justice to qualia. Illuminating though Dennett's discussion is, in many ways, it nevertheless leaves the traditional mind?body problem intact
Keywords Consciousness  Epistemology  Materialism  Mind  Science  Dennett, D
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DOI 10.1080/00201749308602311
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