Epistemic instrumentalism

Synthese 190 (9):1701-1718 (2013)
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Abstract

According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemically rational beliefs are beliefs that are produced in ways that are conducive to certain ends that one wants to attain. In “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique,” Thomas Kelly advances various objections to epistemic instrumentalism. While I agree with the general thrust of Kelly’s objections, he does not distinguish between two forms of epistemic instrumentalism. Intellectualist forms maintain that epistemically rational beliefs are beliefs arrived at in compliance with rules that are conducive to epistemic ends, such as believing true propositions and not believing false propositions. Pragmatist forms maintain that rational beliefs are those that are formed, maintained, and revised in accordance with rules that are conducive to whatever ends one wants to attain. In this paper, I argue against both forms of epistemic instrumentalism and suggest that epistemic instrumentalism grows out of a mistaken conception of what it means to say that the standards of epistemic rationality are ‘normative.’

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Matthew Lockard
Southern Methodist University

Citations of this work

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Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1968 - In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Knowledge and its place in nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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