Isomorphisms and subjective colors

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):959-960 (1999)
Abstract
Palmer describes a “subjective barrier” that limits knowledge of others' experience. We discuss how this barrier extends to all knowledge, becoming less distinct as theoretical constructs are strengthened. We provide evidence for isomorphic experience, among individuals with similar physiologies, by showing that perceived relations between colors are as similar when viewing pigments as when viewing subjective colors caused by flickering bars.
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