David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191 (2008)
This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically, both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important topic for future work.
|Keywords||Virtue Epistemology Epistemic Internalism Epistemic Externalism Epistemic Pluralism Virtue Theory|
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References found in this work BETA
Julia Annas (2003). The Structure of Virtue. In Linda Zagzebski & Michael DePaul (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. 15--33.
Guy Axtell (2001). Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 158--177.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1956). Epistemic Statements and the Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (4):447-460.
John Greco (2001). Virtues and Rules in Epistemology. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 117--141.
Citations of this work BETA
Annette M. Holba (2013). J. M. H. Fritz, Professional Civility: Communicative Virtue at Work. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 115 (3):645-649.
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