Problems for virtue theories in epistemology
Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191 (2008)
| Abstract | This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically, both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important topic for future work. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Virtue Epistemology Epistemic Internalism Epistemic Externalism Epistemic Pluralism Virtue Theory | |||||||||
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Heather Battaly (2010). Introduction: Virtue and Vice. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):1-21.
Michael Brady & Duncan Pritchard (2006). Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):1--8.
Nenad Miscevic (2007). Virtue -Based Epistemology and the Centrality of Truth (Towards a Strong Virtue-Epistemology). Acta Analytica 22 (3):239--266.
John Greco (2003). Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
Reza Lahroodi (2006). Evaluational Internalism, Epistemic Virtues, and the Significance of Trying. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:1-20.
Duncan Pritchard (2003). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
Reza Lahroodi (2007). Evaluating Need for Cognition: A Case Study in Naturalistic Epistemic Virtue Theory. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):227 – 245.
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