David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 32 (4):609-620 (2001)
It is generally thought that objective chances for particular events different from 1 and 0 and determinism are incompatible. However, there are important scientific theories whose laws are deterministic but which also assign non-trivial probabilities to events. The most important of these is statistical mechanics whose probabilities are essential to the explanations of thermodynamic phenomena. These probabilities are often construed as 'ignorance' probabilities representing our lack of knowledge concerning the microstate. I argue that this construal is incompatible with the role of probability in explanation and laws. This is the 'paradox of deterministic probabilities'. After surveying the usual list of accounts of objective chance and finding them inadequate I argue that an account of chance sketched by David Lewis can be modified to solve the paradox of deterministic probabilities and provide an adequate account of the probabilities in deterministic theories like statistical mechanics.
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Clark (1987). Determinism and Probability in Physics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:185--210.
David Lewis (1980). A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance. In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press 83--132.
David Lewis (1994). Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind 103 (412):473-490.
Citations of this work BETA
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2005). Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chance. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):281–307.
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Contemporary Approaches to Statistical Mechanical Probabilities: A Critical Commentary - Part I: The Indifference Approach. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1116-1126.
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Contemporary Approaches to Statistical Mechanical Probabilities: A Critical Commentary - Part II: The Regularity Approach. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1127-1136.
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431.
Antony Eagle (2011). Deterministic Chance. Noûs 45 (2):269 - 299.
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