David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25 (2004)
The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual “interpretations of probability” give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance” he described a framework for representing single case objective chances, showed how they are connected to subjective credences, and sketched a novel account what they are within his Humean account of scientific laws. Here I will describe these contributions and add a little to them.
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Citations of this work BETA
Rachael Briggs (forthcoming). Foundations of Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-16.
Barry Loewer (2012). Two Accounts of Laws and Time. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):115-137.
Elizabeth Miller (2014). Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):567-583.
Elizabeth Miller (2015). Humean Scientific Explanation. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1311-1332.
Jonathan Cohen & Craig Callender (2010). Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood. Erkenntnis 73 (3):427 - 447.
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