Humean Supervenience

Philosophical Topics 24 (1):101-127 (1996)
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DOI 10.5840/philtopics199624112
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Gordon Belot (2012). Quantum States for Primitive Ontologists: A Case Study. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):67-83.
Barry Loewer (2012). Two Accounts of Laws and Time. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):115-137.
Elizabeth Miller (2015). Humean Scientific Explanation. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1311-1332.

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Barry M. Loewer (1995). An Argument for Strong Supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press 218--225.

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