Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):193–208 (2005)
|Abstract||Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Charles Sayward (1989). Do Moral Explanations Matter? Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
Jeremy Randel Koons (2000). Do Normative Facts Need to Explain? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272.
Russ Shafer-Landau (2007). Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329.
Neil Sinclair (2011). The Explanationist Argument for Moral Realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24.
Jonathan Smith (2010). On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1).
Stefan Sencerz (1995). Personal Goodness and Moral Facts. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:481-498.
Gilbert Harman (1986). Moral Explanations of Natural Facts-Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):57-68.
Joseph Millum (2008). A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):385-407.
Luke Robinson (2006). Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism. Mind 115 (458):331-360.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #21,795 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?