Moral explanations of moral beliefs

Abstract
Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00511.x
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Brad Majors (2007). Moral Explanation. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):1–15.
Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.

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