The skeptic and the naïve realist
Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288 (2011)
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| Keywords | Naive Realism skepticism | |||||||||
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M. D. Conduct (2011). Naïve Realism and Extreme Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):201-221.
Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
Keith Allen (2011). Revelation and the Nature of Colour. Dialectica 65 (2):153-176.
Matthew Kennedy (2010). Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.
Jason Leddington (2009). Perceptual Presence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.
B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions: The Elliptical Penny. Philosophy 34 (October):323-330.
Boyd Millar (forthcoming). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Michael Sollberger (2012). Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.
B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (August):118-137.
Heather Logue (2012). What Should the Naïve Realist Say About Total Hallucinations? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.
Michael Sollberger (2007). The Causal Argument Against Disjunctivism. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):245-267.
Thomas Raleigh (2009). Understanding How Experience "Seems". European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):67-78.
David M. Armstrong (1959). Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
Michael Sollberger (2008). Naïve Realism and the Problem of Causation. Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.
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