David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):149-166 (2008)
According to Humeanism, actions cannot be adequately explained without reference to the desires of an agent. Desires are viewed as sources of motivation or as motivating states and thus as having an indispensable role to play in the explanation of actions. One of the main rivals of Humeanism is pure cognitivsm. According to this view, actions are to be explained exclusively by beliefs. The present paper's focus is on arguments Jonathan Dancy has put forward in favor of this pure cognitivist picture. His main line of argument tries to convince us of the claim that desires have no explanatory value at all as regards the explantion of an agent's actions. I argue that none of Dancy's arguments against Humeanism is successful, and moreover that the pure cognitivists position fails on its own terms because pure cognitivism is unable to provide an account of desires that makes intelligible their role in the mental economy of agents.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Attila Tanyi (2014). Pure Cognitivism and Beyond. Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.
Similar books and articles
Patrick Yarnell (2002). Humean Instrumentalism and the Motivational Capacity of Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:499-509.
Pascal Engel (2005). Logical Reasons. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.
Lisa Shabel (2004). Kant's "Argument From Geometry". Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (2):195-215.
Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
Jordan Howard Sobel (1990). Maximization, Stability of Decision, and Actions in Accordance with Reason. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):60-77.
Jonathan Dancy (1995). Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:1-18.
Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). False Consciousness of Intentional Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.
Cei Maslen (2002). A Defense of Humeanism From Nagel's Persimmon. Erkenntnis 57 (1):41-46.
Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #90,409 of 1,679,439 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #111,626 of 1,679,439 )
How can I increase my downloads?