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- Guy Longworth (2008). Comprehending Speech. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):339-373.What is the epistemological role of speech perception in comprehension? More precisely, what is its role in episodes or states of comprehension able to mediate the communication of knowledge? One answer, developed in recent work by Tyler Burge, has it that its role may be limited to triggering mobilizations of the understanding. I argue that, while there is much to be said for such a view, it should not be accepted. I present an alternative account, on which episodes of comprehension are better able to underwrite the interpersonal transmission of knowledge.
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