David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):233-253 (1998)
This essay suggests the possibility of conceiving the transcendental synthesis of imagination in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as the understanding at work on sensibility by developing an active conception of identity according to which the distinction between the imagination and the understanding is merely nominal. Aristotle's philosophy is shown both to provide such a conception of identity and to be tacitly at work in Kant's thinking. Finally, the essay traces this position into the discussion of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment
|Keywords||Kant understanding imagination Critique of Pure Reason|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ty D. Camp, From the Schematic to the Symbolic: The Radical Possibilities of the Imagination in Kant's Third Critique.
Rebecca Kukla (ed.) (2006). Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Amit Ron (2010). The Hermeneutics of the Causal Powers of Meaningful Objects. Journal of Critical Realism 9 (2):155-171.
Sarah L. Gibbons (1994). Kant's Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience. Oxford University Press.
Matthew William Maguire (2006). The Conversion of Imagination: From Pascal Through Rousseau to Tocqueville. Harvard University Press.
Rae Langton (2006). Kant's Phenomena: Extrinsic or Relational Properties? A Reply to Allais. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):170–185.
Mary Domski (2010). Kant on the Imagination and Geometrical Certainty. Perspectives on Science 18 (4):409-431.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #124,708 of 1,911,321 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #48,924 of 1,911,321 )
How can I increase my downloads?