David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):1 - 20 (1990)
Escapism is defined as the attempt to avoid awareness of aversive beliefs. Strategies, and a few examples, of escapism are discussed. It is argued that self-deception is one species of escapism and that entrenched escapism, escapism pursued with the intention of permanently avoiding any awareness of one's belief, no matter what happens, is theoretically irrational, except in the special case where it compensates for irrationality elsewhere, by guarding one from the formation of further irrational beliefs of more serious import than the belief one wishes to avoid. The model of rationality employed in this argument is then extended to practical rationality, and it is argued that entrenched escapism is pragmatically irrational as well, unless it compensates for other irrationalities elsewhere in a person, as, for instance, when a person must avoid certain facts to avoid succumbing irrationally to despair, or unless it compensates for the effects of an environment in which it is otherwise impossible for an optimally functioning person to survive emotionally. The results for entrenched escapism would apply to self-deception as well, since it aims (in all but very odd cases) at the permanent removal of the offending belief. The function of escapism, then, is to compensate for irrational patterns of belief formation, and to maintain effectiveness (for the sake of continuance of the species), insofar as that is possible, in situation in which a rational person would succumb to despair and suicide.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Kyle Swan (2009). Hell and Divine Reasons for Action. Religious Studies 45 (1):51-61.
Andrei Buckareff & Allen Plug (2009). Escapism, Religious Luck, and Divine Reasons for Action. Religious Studies 45 (1):63-72.
Kevin Lynch (2012). On the “Tension” Inherent in Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.
H. P. Rickman (1963). Escapism: The Logical Basis of Ethics. Mind 72 (286):273-274.
Russell E. Jones (2007). Escapism and Luck. Religious Studies 43 (2):205-216.
P. H. Nowell-Smith & E. J. Lemmon (1960). Escapism: The Logical Basis of Ethics. Mind 69 (275):289-300.
A. N. Prior (1958). Escapism: The Logical Basis of Ethics. In A. I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy. University of Washington Press. 610-611.
Ariela Lazar (1999). Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Beliefs Under the Influence. Mind 108 (430):265-290.
George C. Kerner (1971). The Immortality of Utilitarianism and the Escapism of Rule-Utilitarianism. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):36-50.
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1972). Belief and Self-Deception. Inquiry 15 (1-4):387-410.
Kevin Lynch (2013). Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief. Erkenntnis 78 (6):1337-1345.
Christoph Michel & Albert Newen (2010). Self-Deception as Pseudo-Rational Regulation of Belief. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
Robert Audi (1997). Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
William N. Whisner (1993). Self-Deception and Other-Person Deception: Toward a New Conceptualization of Self- Deception. Philosophia 22 (3-4):223-240.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads21 ( #92,902 of 1,410,136 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #57,864 of 1,410,136 )
How can I increase my downloads?