David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508 (2006)
Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, and I argue that it is difficult to find a perspective from which Quine can criticize Carnap in a non-question-begging way.
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
W. V. Quine (1953). From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1992). Pursuit of Truth. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Sebastian Lutz (2012). Artificial Language Philosophy of Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Browse Results) 2 (2):181–203.
Sebastian Lutz (2012). Artificial Language Philosophy of Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):181-203.
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