Graduate studies at Western
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508 (2006)
|Abstract||Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, and I argue that it is difficult to find a perspective from which Quine can criticize Carnap in a non-question-begging way.|
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