Framing the frame problem

Synthese 82 (3):353-74 (1990)
The frame problem is widely reputed among philosophers to be one of the deepest and most difficult problems of cognitive science. This paper discusses three recent attempts to display this problem: Dennett's problem of ignoring obviously irrelevant knowledge, Haugeland's problem of efficiently keeping track of salient side effects, and Fodor's problem of avoiding the use of kooky concepts. In a negative vein, it is argued that these problems bear nothing but a superficial similarity to the frame problem of AI, so that they do not provide reasons to disparage standard attempts to solve it. More positively, it is argued that these problems are easily solved by slight variations on familiar AI themes. Finally, some discussion is devoted to more difficult problems confronting AI.
Keywords Cognitive Science  Epistemology  Frame  Dennett, D  Haugeland, J
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413881
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Sheldon J. Chow (2013). What's the Problem with the Frame Problem? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):309-331.

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