David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296 (2010)
It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, I show that it helps us understand the requirements of substantive rationality, or what we are rationally required to do when responding to reasons.
|Keywords||Rationality Mark Schroeder Internalism/externalism Normative Reasons Metaethics Epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
John Gibbons (2006). Access Externalism. Mind 115 (457):19-39.
Thomas Kelly, Evidence. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
Mark Schroeder (2004). The Scope of Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.
Mark Schroeder (2011). What Does It Take to "Have" a Reason? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 201--22.
Citations of this work BETA
Tim Henning (2012). Normative Reasons Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):593-624.
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