Having reasons and the factoring account

Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296 (2010)
It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, I show that it helps us understand the requirements of substantive rationality, or what we are rationally required to do when responding to reasons.
Keywords Rationality  Mark Schroeder  Internalism/externalism  Normative Reasons  Metaethics  Epistemology
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DOI 10.2307/40783265
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Williams (1979). Internal and External Reasons. In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press 101-113.

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Citations of this work BETA
Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
Jonathan Way (2012). Explaining the Instrumental Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.
Kurt Sylvan (2015). What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
Tim Henning (2014). Normative Reasons Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):593-624.

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