Having reasons and the factoring account

Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296 (2010)
Abstract
It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, I show that it helps us understand the requirements of substantive rationality, or what we are rationally required to do when responding to reasons.
Keywords Rationality  Mark Schroeder  Internalism/externalism  Normative Reasons  Metaethics  Epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,361
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Kelly, Evidence. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
Mark Schroeder (2008). Having Reasons. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.

View all 10 references

Citations of this work BETA
Tim Henning (2014). Normative Reasons Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):593-624.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-02-03

Total downloads

89 ( #14,101 of 1,102,718 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #46,741 of 1,102,718 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.