David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Can one sense one’s own mind, as one senses nonmental entities in one’s environment and body? According to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the fraudulent commonsense idea of a "mind’s eye" obstructs clearheaded attempts to explain introspection and consciousness. I concede that inner sense cannot directly explain consciousness and introspection in all their forms, but I do think a carefully specified kind of inner sense can account for one very special kind of introspective consciousness. It is special because it is the key to explaining the most puzzling kind of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness—there being "something it is like" to have certain mental states. My aim in this paper is to defend this view against accusations— twenty-two in all!—rather than to argue positively for the view. However, I begin by indicating some of the motivation for the account I defend
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Dorothée Legrand (2009). Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.
John Louis Schwenkler (2009). Space and Self-Awareness. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
David M. Rosenthal (1993). Explaining Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Oup. 406--421.
William G. Lycan (1995). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
Eric Lormand (1996). Nonphenomenal Consciousness. Noûs 30 (2):242-61.
Rebecca Copenhaver (2007). Reid on Consciousness: Hop, Hot or For? Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):613-634.
Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2012). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #50,401 of 1,410,302 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #52,180 of 1,410,302 )
How can I increase my downloads?