David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Noûs 30 (2):242-61 (1996)
There is not a uniform kind of consciousness common to all conscious mental states: beliefs, emotions, perceptual experiences, pains, moods, verbal thoughts, and so on. Instead, we need a distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal consciousness. As if consciousness simpliciter were not mysterious enough, philosophers have recently focused their worries on phenomenal (or qualitative) consciousness, the kind that explains or constitutes there being "something it.
|Keywords||Consciousness Mental States Metaphysics Mood Phenomena|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
Declan Smithies (2013). The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
Tim Bayne & Maja Spener (2010). Introspective Humility. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
Daniel M. Haybron (2007). Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall. Noûs 41 (3):394–428.
Similar books and articles
Peter Carruthers (2003). Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Neil Campbell Manson (2000). State Consciousness and Creature Consciousness: A Real Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):405-410.
David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.
Uriah Kriegel (2006). Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
Rocco J. Gennaro (1996). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. John Benjamins.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Epistemic Consciousness. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 33 (3):425-441.
Martine Nida-Rumelin (1995). What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 219--41.
Greg Janzen (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 (4):707-733.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads91 ( #14,476 of 1,099,788 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #14,384 of 1,099,788 )
How can I increase my downloads?