Nonphenomenal consciousness

Noûs 30 (2):242-61 (1996)
There is not a uniform kind of consciousness common to all conscious mental states: beliefs, emotions, perceptual experiences, pains, moods, verbal thoughts, and so on. Instead, we need a distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal consciousness. As if consciousness simpliciter were not mysterious enough, philosophers have recently focused their worries on phenomenal consciousness, the kind that explains or constitutes there being "something it
Keywords Consciousness  Mental States  Metaphysics  Mood  Phenomena
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