David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Topics 28 (2):147-170 (2000)
In the last of his three Royce Lectures called "Self‑Knowledge and 'Inner Sense'", Sydney Shoemaker attempts to reconcile two commitments: (1) that experiences have "qualia", nonrepresentational features that constitute what it is like to have the experiences, and (2) that perceptual experiences seem "diaphanous", yielding to introspection only the way they represent the environment, not intrinsic or otherwise nonrepresentational qualia. On the idea that we internally sense qualiaï¿½that we sense what our experiences are likeï¿½one way to explain apparent diaphanousness is to maintain that these qualia are mistakenly "projected" onto the environment, that in perception we erroneously sense qualia as belonging to environmental objects. Shoemaker rejects both the projection view and the existence of inner sense, and develops an alternative reconciliation. I will describe reasons to doubt his positive proposal, and ways to save projection and inner sense from his criticisms
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Sydney Shoemaker (1975). Functionalism and Qualia. Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
Cynthia Macdonald (1999). Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):711-38.
Sydney Shoemaker (1990). Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50 (Supplement):109-131.
Earl Conee (1985). The Possibility of Absent Qualia. Philosophical Review 94 (July):345-66.
Timm Triplett (2006). Shoemaker on Qualia, Phenomenal Properties and Spectrum Inversions. Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.
Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Phenomenal Character of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2).
Nicholas P. White (1985). Professor Shoemaker and the so-Called `Qualia' of Experience. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):369-383.
Dominic M. Mciver Lopes (2000). What Is It Like to See with Your Ears? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #34,779 of 1,140,006 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #32,712 of 1,140,006 )
How can I increase my downloads?