David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):392-399 (2011)
It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide-scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow-scopers’) that it violates narrow-scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter-example to narrow-scope views. But a narrow-scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim that we always violate conditional narrow-scope requirements when we do not comply with them. I show how Brunero's objection can be met by denying this claim, and I provide independent arguments in favour of denying it.
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Citations of this work BETA
Benjamin Kiesewetter (2015). Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle. Ethics 125 (4):921-946.
Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
Errol Lord (2013). The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality. Philosophical Studies (3):1-22.
Alex Worsnip (2015). Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers. Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.
Giorgio Volpe (2012). Cornerstones: You'd Better Believe Them. Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
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