David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):59-70 (1987)
The Principle of Credulity---i.e. that if I have an experience apparently of X then in the absence of good reasons to think the experience non-veridical I have evidence that X exists---is an essential premise in many formulations of the argument from religious experience. I defend this use of the principle against objections offered by William Rowe. I argue that experiences of God are checkable. and in ways (epistemically) significantly similar to the ways sensory experiences are checkable. and that treating sensory experiences as Rowe suggests we treat experiences of God demands wholesale scepticism with regard to the senses
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Kai-man Kwan (2006). Can Religious Experience Provide Justification for the Belief in God? The Debate in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 1 (6):640–661.
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