Free will and the necessity of the present

Analysis 69 (1):63-69 (2009)
Abstract
Joseph Keim Campbell has recently criticized Peter van Inwagen's Third Argument against compatibilism for its reliance on the existence of a remote past. In response, Anthony Brueckner has offered a new version of the Third Argument showing that determinism and free will are incompatible for all times t relative to which there is a past . In this paper I argue that although Brueckner's retooled argument fails to prove anything in favour of incompatibilism, its conclusion can be exploited to provide another version of van Inwagen's original argument that doesn't rely on the existence of past times, thus withstanding Campbell's criticism
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Van Inwagen (1989). When is the Will Free? Philosophical Perspectives 3:399 - 422.
Citations of this work BETA
Alicia Finch (2013). Against Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.
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