David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Bioethics 23 (5):291-299 (2009)
Advances in reproductive technologies – in particular in genetic screening and selection – have occasioned renewed interest in the moral justifiability of the reasons that motivate the decision to have a child. The capacity to select for desired blood and tissue compatibilities has led to the much discussed 'saviour sibling' cases in which parents seek to 'have one child to save another'. Heightened interest in procreative reasons is to be welcomed, since it prompts a more general philosophical interrogation of the grounds for moral appraisal of reasons-to-parent, and of the extent to which such reasons are relevant to the moral assessment of procreation itself. I start by rejecting the idea that we can use a distinction between 'other-regarding' and 'future-child-regarding' reasons as a basis on which to distinguish good from bad procreative reasons. I then offer and evaluate three potential grounds for elucidating and establishing a relationship between procreative motivation and the rightness/wrongness of procreative conduct: the predictiveness, the verdictiveness, and the expressiveness of procreative reasons.
|Keywords||reproduction procreation saviour siblings having children Applied ethics reproductive technology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Franco Palazzi (2014). Would Human Extinction Be Morally Wrong? Philosophia 42 (4):1063-1084.
David Wasserman & Adrienne Asch (2012). Selecting for Disability: Acceptable Lives, Acceptable Reasons. American Journal of Bioethics 12 (8):30 - 31.
Similar books and articles
Patricia Greenspan (2011). Craving the Right: Emotions and Moral Reasons. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press 39.
Rebecca Bennett (2009). The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. Bioethics 23 (5):265-273.
Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu (2010). The Value of Sex in Procreative Reasons. American Journal of Bioethics 10 (7):22-24.
Mianna Lotz (2011). Rethinking Procreation: Why It Matters Why We Have Children. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2):105-121.
Juha Räikkä (2001). Coercive Population Policies, Procreative Freedom, and Morality. Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):67-77.
Guy Kahane (2009). Non-Identity, Self-Defeat, and Attitudes to Future Children. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):193 - 214.
R. Juha (2001). Coercive Population Policies, Procreative Freedom, and Morality. Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):67 – 77.
Julian Savulescu & Guy Kahane (2009). The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life. Bioethics 23 (5):274-290.
Jakob Elster (2011). Procreative Beneficence – Cui Bono? Bioethics 25 (9):482-488.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #74,089 of 1,793,064 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #281,225 of 1,793,064 )
How can I increase my downloads?