David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2):105-121 (2011)
Attempts to explain the intuitive wrongfulness in alleged ‘wrongful life’ cases commonly do so by attributing harmful wrongdoing to the procreators in question. Such an approach identifies the resulting child as having been, in some sense, culpably harmed by their coming into existence. By contrast, and enlarging on work elsewhere, this paper explores the relevance of procreative motivation, rather than harm, for determining the morality of procreative conduct. I begin by reviewing the main objection to the harm-based approach, which arises out of Derek Parfit's analysis of the non-identity problem and its implications for preconception cases. Most attempts to avoid the non-identity objection adopt either an impersonal harm approach or draw on some version of a metaphysical modal counterpart theory to defend a person-affecting harm account. But here I develop an alternative view. The proposed account construes the wrongness in the considered cases as ‘evil’ rather than harm, and the type of evil in question as being of a non-grievance, welfare-connected, collective kind. Understanding the wrongness in this way offers a basis for the view that it matters morally why we procreate, and not just whether or how we do so
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
M. A. Roberts (2009). What is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to Choice to Harms to Persons. Law and Philosophy 28 (1):1 - 57.
Carson Strong (2005). Harming by Conceiving: A Review of Misconceptions and a New Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (5):491 – 516.
E. Haavi Morreim (1988). The Concept of Harm Reconceived: A Different Look at Wrongful Life. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 7 (1):3 - 33.
Justin Patrick Mcbrayer (2008). Rights, Indirect Harms and the Non-Identity Problem. Bioethics 22 (6):299–306.
Rivka Weinberg (2013). Existence: Who Needs It? The Non‐Identity Problem and Merely Possible People. Bioethics 27 (9):471-484.
Anthony Wrigley (2012). Harm to Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):175-190.
Mianna Lotz (2009). Procreative Reasons-Relevance: On the Moral Significance of Why We Have Children. Bioethics 23 (5):291-299.
David K. Chan (2007). Wrongful Life, Wrongful Disability, and the Argument Against Cloning. Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):257-272.
Melissa Seymour Fahmy (2011). On the Supposed Moral Harm of Selecting for Deafness. Bioethics 25 (3):128-136.
Brooke Alan Trisel (2012). How Best to Prevent Future Persons From Suffering: A Reply to Benatar. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):79-93.
Janet Malek (2006). Identity, Harm, and the Ethics of Reproductive Technology. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (1):83 – 95.
E. Haavi Morreim (1983). Conception and the Concept of Harm. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (2):137-158.
Fiona Woollard (2012). Have We Solved the Non-Identity Problem? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):677-690.
Hamish Stewart (2009). The Limits of the Harm Principle. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):17-35.
M. E. Winston (1986). Abortion and Parental Responsibility. Journal of Medical Humanities and Bioethics 7 (1):33-56.
Added to index2011-03-05
Total downloads22 ( #65,924 of 1,088,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?