David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Papers 29 (2):73-105 (2000)
Abstract Few theoretical insights have emerged from the extensive literature discussions of petitio principii argument. In particular, the pattern of petitio analysis has largely been one of movement between the two sides of a dichotomy, that of form and content. In this paper, I trace the basis of this dichotomy to a dualist conception of mind and world. I argue for the rejection of the form/content dichotomy on the ground that its dualist presuppositions generate a reductionist analysis of certain concepts which are central to the analysis of petitio argument. I contend, for example, that no syntactic relation can assimilate within its analysis the essentially holistic nature of a notion like justification. In this regard, I expound a form of dialectical criticism which has been frequently employed in the philosophical arguments of Hilary Putnam. Here the focus of analysis is upon the way in which the proponent of a position proceeds to explain or argue for his/her own particular theses. My conclusion points to the use of such dialectic within future analyses of petitio principii
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gregor Betz (2010). Petitio Principii and Circular Argumentation as Seen From a Theory of Dialectical Structures. Synthese 175 (3):327-349.
David Botting (2011). Can 'Big' Questions Be Begged? Argumentation 25 (1):23-36.
Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi (2005). Petitio Principii: What's Wrong? Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Louise Cummings (2002). Hilary Putnam's Dialectical Thinking: An Application to Fallacy Theory. [REVIEW] Argumentation 16 (2):197-229.
Louise Cummings (2003). Formal Dialectic in Fallacy Inquiry: An Unintelligible Circumscription of Argumentative Rationality? [REVIEW] Argumentation 17 (2):161-183.
Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2006). A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies. Synthese 152 (2):207 - 236.
John Woods & Douglas Walton (1975). Petitio Principii. Synthese 31 (1):107 - 127.
BimalKrishna Matilal (1974). A Note on the Ny?Ya Fallacy S?Dhyasama and Petitio Principii. Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (3-4):211-224.
Clifton B. Perry (1991). Hearsay, Nonassertive, Conduct, and Petitio Principii. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (1):45-49.
Juha Saatsi (2009). Form Vs. Content-Driven Arguments for Realism. In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (2011). Does Semantic Naturalism Rest on a Mistake? In Nuccetelli & Seay Susana & Gary (ed.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
Danny Frederick (2011). Deduction and Novelty. The Reasoner 5 (4):56-57.
Luciano Floridi (1994). The Problem of the Justification of a Theory of Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 25 (1):17 - 49.
Erik Myin (1998). Trading in Form for Content and Taking the Sting Out of the Mind-Body Problem. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):766-766.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist' ? Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads1 ( #439,159 of 1,101,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #290,992 of 1,101,088 )
How can I increase my downloads?