David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Artificial Intelligence and Law 3 (3):159-189 (1995)
We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is a formal understanding of rationales, a partial taxonomy, and a foundation for computer programs that represent and reason with rationales.The five kinds of rationales are as follows: (c)ompression and (s)pecialization, which yield rules, and (d)isputation, which yields a decision. These are modeled as potentially changing the focus of the dispute. Then there are (f)it, a rationale for rules, and (r)esolution, a rationale for decisions. These cannot be modeled as simply; they force disputation to a meta-level, at least temporarily.
|Keywords||rationale ratio legis ratio decidendi principle purpose dialectic procedure argument rule policy backing defeasible reasoning case-based reasoning logic|
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Citations of this work BETA
Giovanni Sartor (2009). Legal Concepts as Inferential Nodes and Ontological Categories. Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (3):217-251.
H. Prakken & G. Sartor (1996). A Dialectical Model of Assessing Conflicting Arguments in Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):331-368.
Henry Prakken (2012). Reconstructing Popov V. Hayashi in a Framework for Argumentation with Structured Arguments and Dungean Semantics. Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (1):57-82.
Trevor Bench-Capon, Michał Araszkiewicz, Kevin Ashley, Katie Atkinson, Floris Bex, Filipe Borges, Daniele Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, Jack G. Conrad, Enrico Francesconi, Thomas F. Gordon, Guido Governatori, Jochen L. Leidner, David D. Lewis, Ronald P. Loui, L. Thorne McCarty, Henry Prakken, Frank Schilder, Erich Schweighofer, Paul Thompson, Alex Tyrrell, Bart Verheij, Douglas N. Walton & Adam Z. Wyner (2012). A History of AI and Law in 50 Papers: 25 Years of the International Conference on AI and Law. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (3):215-319.
Trevor Bench-Capon & Henry Prakken (2010). Using Argument Schemes for Hypothetical Reasoning in Law. Artificial Intelligence and Law 18 (2):153-174.
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