Relativity of value and the consequentialist umbrella

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536 (2004)
Abstract
Does the real difference between non-consequentialist and consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Non-consequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ('honouring' rather than 'promoting'). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honouring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of non-consequentialist theories can only be achieved by including a distinction between temporal relativity and neutrality in addition to the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality.
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Chappell (2001). A Way Out of Pettit's Dilemma. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):95-99.
Frances Howard-Snyder (1994). The Heart of Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 76 (1):107 - 129.

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Citations of this work BETA
Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
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