A General Theory of Domination and Justice
OUP Oxford (2010)
| Abstract | In all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized so far as possible. Surprisingly, however, political and social theorists have failed to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of domination in general. This study aims to redress this lacuna. It argues first, that domination should be understood as a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them; this is termed the 'arbitrary power conception' of domination. It argues second, that we should regard it as wrong to perpetrate or permit unnecessary domination and, thus, that as a matter of justice the political and social institutions and practices of any society should be organized so as to minimize avoidable domination; this is termed 'justice as minimizing domination', a conception of social justice that connects with more familiar civic republican accounts of freedom as non-domination. In developing these arguments, this study employs a variety of methodological techniques - including conceptual analysis, formal modelling, social theory, and moral philosophy; existing accounts of dependency, power, social convention, and so on are clarified, expanded, or revised along the way. While of special interest to contemporary civic republicans, this study should appeal to a broad audience with diverse methodological and substantive interests. | |||||||||
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| ISBN(s) | 9780199579419 0199579415 | |||||||||
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Pamela Pansardi (forthcoming). A Non-Normative Theory of Power and Domination. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-20.
M. J. Thompson (2013). Reconstructing Republican Freedom: A Critique of the Neo-Republican Concept of Freedom as Non-Domination. Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (3):277-298.
Alan M. S. J. Coffee (2012). Mary Wollstonecraft, Freedom and the Enduring Power of Social Domination. European Journal of Political Theory 12 (2):116-135.
R. B. Talisse (forthcoming). Impunity and Domination: A Puzzle for Republicanism. European Journal of Political Theory.
Henry S. Richardson (2006). Republicanism and Democratic Injustice. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2):175-200.
Mark Rigstad (2011). Republicanism and Geopolitical Domination. Journal of Political Power 4 (2):279-300.
Miranda Fricker (2013). Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom? Synthese 190 (7):1317-1332.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2012). Review of Frank Lovett, A General Theory of Domination and Justice (Oxford UP, 2010). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):190-192.
Eoin Daly (2011). Non-Domination as a Primary Good: Re-Thinking the Frontiers of the 'Political' in Rawls's Political Liberalism. Jurisprudence 2 (1):37-72.
Giorel Curran (1999). Murray Bookchin and the Domination of Nature. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2 (2):59-94.
S. R. Krause (2013). Beyond Non-Domination: Agency, Inequality and the Meaning of Freedom. Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (2):187-208.
Lena Halldenius (1998). Non-Domination and Egalitarian Welfare Politics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (3):335-353.
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