The Ever Conscious View: A Critique

Elizabeth Harman has recently proposed a new theory of moral status, the Ever Conscious View. It is the view that "a being has moral status at a time just in case it is alive at that time and there is a time in its life at which it is conscious" (Harman, 2007, 220). In other words, all and only beings that (1) are alive and (2) either were, are, or will be conscious have moral status. In the following, I examine Harman's defense of her Ever Conscious View, raise a number of objections to it, and conclude that the Ever Conscious View is, as it stands, implausible
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    Byron L. Haines (1993). A Critique of Harman's Empiric Relativism. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:97-107.
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