David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
(draft; call for comments) The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of believing or intending and surely they are an irremovable element in constitutive aims of believing or intending. Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative (this claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative). The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of the intentional states of the human mind. Our intentional states are always correlated with our dispositions; when I refer to our ?dispositions? here, I do not mean to focus exclusively on our behavioural dispositions; I mean to include our mental dispositions as well, such as our dispositions to revise our beliefs and intentions in response to various conditions. We can hold that the normative nature of our judgement is intrinsic with our rational dispositions: the rational dispositions of our mind have essential normative properties, even if we must not identify mental properties with their normative role in mental activity.In this contest I deal with the concepts of factual ultimate aim and normative ultimate aim.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael Pendlebury (2010). How to Be a Normative Expressivist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
J. McKitrick (2003). A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.
Sungho Choi (2009). The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):568-590.
David Yates (2012). Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Causal Exclusion. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (13).
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Against Essential Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
Ralph Wedgwood (2006). How We Know What Ought to Be. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.
Ralph Wedgwood (2007). Normativism Defended. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 85--102.
Ralph Wedgwood (2009). The Normativity of the Intentional. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press
James Connelly (2012). Meaning is Normative: A Response to Hattiangadi. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (1):55-71.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #88,425 of 1,781,303 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #88,119 of 1,781,303 )
How can I increase my downloads?