David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy 75 (294):571-586 (2000)
Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an emergentist character, are consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be advocated
|Keywords||Causation Closure Emergentism Metaphysics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.
David Yates (2009). Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.
Max Kistler (2010). Mechanisms and Downward Causation. Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):595-609.
Matthew C. Haug (2009). Two Kinds of Completeness and the Uses (and Abuses) of Exclusion Principles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):379-401.
Barbara Montero (2003). The Epistemic/Ontic Divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404-418.
Similar books and articles
Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
Robert Larmer (2009). Divine Agency and the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. Zygon 44 (3):543-557.
Christian Sachse (2007). What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan. Erkenntnis 67 (2):201 - 205.
Achim Stephan (2002). Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):77-93.
Agustín Vicente (2006). On the Causal Completeness of Physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.
E. J. Lowe (2003). Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 137-154.
Eric Marcus (2005). Mental Causation in a Physical World. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
Daniel von Wachter (2006). Why the Argument From Causal Closure Against the Existence of Immaterial Things is Bad. In H. J. Koskinen, R. Vilkko & S. Philström (eds.), Science - A Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang.
Kile Jones (2008). The Causal Closure of Physics: An Explanation and Critique. World Futures 64 (3):179 – 186.
Olga Markič (2004). Causal Emergentism. Acta Analytica 19 (33):65-81.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads358 ( #579 of 1,096,895 )
Recent downloads (6 months)26 ( #3,807 of 1,096,895 )
How can I increase my downloads?