Material coincidence and the cinematographic fallacy: A response to Olson

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):369-372 (2002)
Abstract
Eric T. Olson has argued that those who hold that two material objects can exactly coincide at a moment of time, with one of these objects constituting the other, face an insuperable difficulty in accounting for the alleged differences between the objects, such as their being of different kinds and possessing different persistence-conditions. The differences, he suggests, are inexplicable, given that the objects in question are composed of the same particles related in precisely the same way. In response, I show that the differences are not at all inexplicable once it is recognized that the conditions for a persisting object to be composed by certain particles at a moment of time must involve facts concerning other moments of time, and that the relevant facts are different for persisting objects of different kinds. Philosophers who neglect this sort of constraint on composition principles may be said to be victims of the 'cinematographic fallacy'
Keywords Coincidence  Fallacy  Identity  Material  Metaphysics  Object  Olson, E
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Citations of this work BETA
    Katherine Hawley (2006). Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):481 – 493.
    Katherine Hawley (2008). Persistence and Determination. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):197-212.
    Eric T. Olson (2003). Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):92–95.
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    74 ( #15,239 of 1,088,371 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,449 of 1,088,371 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.