David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23 (2006)
Non-Cartesian substance dualism maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level.
|Keywords||Cartesianism Causation Dualism Mental Causation Metaphysics Person Self|
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References found in this work BETA
Karl R. Popper & John C. Eccles (1977). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. Springer.
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
E. J. Lowe (2006). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Susan Schneider (2013). Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem 1. Noûs 47 (1):135-153.
Susan Schneider (2012). Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76.
Jeff Engelhardt (2015). Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1125-1146.
Jeff Engelhardt (2015). Property Reductive Emergent Dualism. Philosophia 43 (1):63-75.
Kirk Ludwig (2013). The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701.
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