David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 57 (1):88–91 (1997)
Harold Noonan concedes the force of an objection I raise against Gareth Evans's argument that there cannot be ontically indeterminate identity statements, but tries to establish the same conclusion by another line of reasoning which does not appeal to identity-involving properties. However, it can be seen that Noonan's new argument is no more satisfactory than Evans's, once due account is taken of the tensed character of properties of the kind to which Noonan appeals
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