Self, agency, and mental causation

Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8):225-239 (1999)
A self or person does not appear to be identifiable with his or her organic body, nor with any part of it, such as the brain; and yet selves seem to be agents, capable of bringing about physical events as causal consequences of certain of their conscious mental states. How is this possible in a universe in which, it appears, every physical event has a sufficient cause which is wholly physical? The answer is that this is possible if a certain kind of naturalistic dualism is true, according to which the conscious mental states of selves, although not identifiable with physical states of their brains, are emergent effects of prior physical causes. Moreover, mental causation on this model promises to explain certain aspects of physical behaviour which may appear arbitrary and coincidental from a purely physical point of view
Keywords Agency  Causation  Mental  Metaphysics  Self  Volition
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Sophie Gibb (2015). VIII—Defending Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):131-146.

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