David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1996)
In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge
|Keywords||Action Experience Imagination Metaphysics Mind Perception Self Self-knowledge Subject Thought|
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|Call number||BD450.L65 1996|
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Citations of this work BETA
E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.
Daniel Kolak (2008). Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity. Synthese 162 (3):341 - 372.
Eric T. Olson (2003). Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.
Barry F. Dainton & Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.
Uwe Meixner (2006). Classical Intentionality. Erkenntnis 65 (1):25-45.
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