There are no easy problems of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):266-71 (1995)
This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problems of consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedly being susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms and the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia' resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued, rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experience and their intimate interrelationship, thereby neglecting a vitally important insight of Kant. From a Kantian perspective, our capacity for conceptual thought is so inextricably bound up with our capacity for phenomenal consciousness that it is an illusion to imagine that there are any `easy' problems of consciousness, resolvable within the computational or neural paradigms
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,865
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
David Hodgson (1996). The Easy Problems Ain't so Easy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):69-75.
Dan Zahavi (2005). Intentionality and Experience. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):299-318.
Liam P. Dempsey (2002). Chalmers' Fading and Dancing Qualla. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

14 ( #180,066 of 1,725,141 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #81,204 of 1,725,141 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.