The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science

Oxford University Press (2006)
Abstract
E. J. Lowe, a prominent figure in contemporary metaphysics, sets out and defends his theory of what there is. His four-category ontology is a metaphysical system which recognizes four fundamental categories of beings: substantial and non-substantial particulars and substantial and non-substantial universals. Lowe argues that this system has an explanatory power which is unrivaled by more parsimonious theories and that this counts decisively in its favor. He shows that it provides a powerful explanatory framework for a unified account of causation, dispositions, natural laws, natural necessity and many other related matters, thus constituting a full metaphysical foundation for natural science.
Keywords Ontology  Metaphysics  Science Philosophy
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Call number Q175.32.O58.L69 2006
ISBN(s) 0199254397   9780199254392
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