|Abstract||Two questions are distinguished: how to program a machine so that it behaves in a manner that would lead us to ascribe consciousness to it; and what is involved in saying that something is conscious. The distinction can be seen in cases where anaesthetics have failed to work on patients temporarily paralysed.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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