Chapter 2 the development of normative reason

x2.1 Non-contradiction One can think wrong. The fact that after much thought one has reached a conclusion is no guarantee that the conclusion reached is right. Only a very opinionated man would refuse to concede the possibility of error, and once the admission of fallibility is made, the problem of justifying one's beliefs becomes acute. So we formulate our reasons as best we can. But even when formulated, they may fail to convince. Only if people are willing to be reasonable can they be reasoned with. None so obdurate as those who will not listen to reason, and with them at least it is better to save one's breath than to attempt to convince them. You just cannot argue with people who will not be argued with. With them we can only let them go their way, as did Socrates; E 1&# (ea chairein).
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