David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (3):225 – 234 (1995)
Abstract Quantum mechanics has seemed to defy all attempts to construe it realistically, but antirealism, like the many?worlds hypothesis, is even more difficult to accept. In order to give a realist construal of quantum mechanics, we need first to distinguish the objective and rational aspect of reality from the paradigmatic thing?like aspects of having determinate physical properties: quantum?mechanical entities may be real in the former sense though not in the latter. Anti?realist arguments are based on the difficulty of giving an account of quantum?mechanical collapse and the apparent superluminal velocities involved. Objections to superluminal velocities on the score of the special theory of relativity are found not to be conclusive, and the price?there being some preferred frame of reference?to be acceptable. A sketch of a probabilistic account of quantum?mechanical collapse is offered, which makes the difference between the macro? and the micro?world a matter of degree rather than kind. If that, or some other, account proved acceptable, we could be quantum?mechanical realists, though quantum?mechanical reality would be very different from that of material objects in hardware shops
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Roger Penrose (1989). The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford University Press.
Roger Penrose (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press.
Roger Penrose & C. J. Isham (eds.) (1986). Quantum Concepts in Space and Time. New York ;Oxford University Press.
Graham Nerlich (1982). Special Relativity is Not Based on Causality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (4):361-388.
J. P. Day & J. R. Lucas (1973). The Concept of Probability. Philosophical Quarterly 23 (90):83.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Lockwood (1997). As Time Goes By. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (1):35 – 51.
Peter Hodgson (1997). Realism and Quantum Mechanics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (1):53 – 65.
Rom Harré (1995). Realism and an Ontology of Powerful Particulars. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (3):285 – 300.
Rom Harré (1995). Realism and an Ontology of Powerful Particulars. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (3):285-300.
Similar books and articles
Joseph Berkovitz & Meir Hemmo (2005). Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics and Relativity: A Reconsideration. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 35 (3):373-397.
John F. Halpin (1991). What is the Logical Form of Probability Assignment in Quantum Mechanics? Philosophy of Science 58 (1):36-60.
Jeffrey A. Barrett (1994). The Suggestive Properties of Quantum Mechanics Without the Collapse Postulate. Erkenntnis 41 (2):233 - 252.
Andreas Hüttemann (2005). Explanation, Emergence and Quantum-Entanglement. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):114-127.
George Darby (2010). Quantum Mechanics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):227-245.
Meir Hemmo (2007). Quantum Probability and Many Worlds. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):333-350.
Peter Kosso (2000). Quantum Mechanics and Realism. Foundations of Science 5 (1):47-60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #222,345 of 1,940,952 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #457,800 of 1,940,952 )
How can I increase my downloads?