Paraconsistent logic in The Office

The Philosophers' Magazine 42 (42):100-104 (2008)
Normally, we would accuse anyone who holds inconsistent beliefs of irrationality. However, Keenan apologists may claim that in some circumstances it does seem perfectly rational to hold inconsistent beliefs. And we are not alone in this assertion. A small band of philosophers, led most notably by Graham Priest, have also championed this cause, the cause of paraconsistency
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DOI tpm20084256
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Greg Restall (2002). Paraconsistency Everywhere. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):147-156.
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