David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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I have no quarrel with the first two sentences: but the third, though charitable and courteous, is quite untrue. Although there are criticisms which can be levelled against the Gödelian argument, most of the critics have not read either of my, or either of Penrose's, expositions carefully, and seek to refute arguments we never put forward, or else propose as a fatal objection one that had already been considered and countered in our expositions of the argument. Hence my title. The Gödelian Argument uses Gödel's theorem to show that minds cannot be explained in purely mechanist terms. It has been put forward, in different forms, by Gödel himself, by Penrose, and by me
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