|Abstract||In 1931 Kurt Gödel proved two theorems about the completeness and consistency of first-order arithmetic. Their implications for philosophy are profound. Many fashionable tenets are shown to be untenable: many traditional intuitions are vindicated by incontrovertible arguments|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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