|Abstract||Putnam argued in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History that it is not epistemically possible that we are brains in a vat (of a certain sort). If his argument is correct, and can be extended in certain ways, then it seems that we can lay to rest the traditional skeptical worry that most of our beliefs about the external world are false. Putnam's argument that we know that we are not brains in a vat has two parts.|
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