Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics

Noûs 41 (3):355–393 (2007)
This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.
Keywords Collective Action  Joint Intention  Shared Intention
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00652.x
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stephanie Collins (2013). Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2013). Interacting Mindreaders. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

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